diff --git a/gems/rodauth/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26.yml b/gems/rodauth/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca62fc3725 --- /dev/null +++ b/gems/rodauth/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26.yml @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +--- +gem: rodauth +ghsa: jv3v-q542-9c26 +url: https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26 +title: WebAuthn authentication challenges are not bound to a session + or single-use, so a captured passkey assertion (signCount 0) can + be replayed indefinitely to log in via webauthn_login +date: 2026-11-16 +description: | + WebAuthn assertions can be replayed: authentication challenges are + not bound to the session and are not single-use + + ## Summary + + Rodauth's webauthn feature issues a random authentication challenge + and sends it to the client together with an HMAC (webauthn_auth_challenge / + webauthn_auth_challenge_hmac). On submission, valid_webauthn_credential_auth? + accepts any challenge whose HMAC is valid, taken from the request + parameters. The challenge is not stored server-side, not bound to + the session or account, has no expiry, and is not consumed after use. + + So the only thing stopping a previously used assertion from being + accepted again is the WebAuthn signature counter. The WebAuthn spec + lets authenticators always report signCount = 0, and synced passkeys + (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, most password-manager + passkeys) do. For those credentials, webauthn-ruby's valid_sign_count? + returns true for 0 → 0, so the counter check does nothing. + + Result: with webauthn_login (passwordless) enabled, anyone who obtains + one previously submitted /webauthn-login POST body (assertion + + challenge + challenge HMAC) can log in as that user. They can do it + from a fresh, unauthenticated session, as many times as they like, + with no time limit. Logging out or changing the password does not + stop it. Only removing the WebAuthn key does. + + ## Impact + + Full account takeover of any account that uses a synced passkey (or + any authenticator reporting signCount 0) on an app with webauthn_login + (or webauthn_autofill) enabled. The attacker needs one previously + submitted assertion request body. Ways to get one include application + or reverse-proxy request-body logs, APM/error-tracking breadcrumbs, + a debugging proxy, or a one-time script injection on the origin. + Once obtained, the value works as a permanent password-equivalent: + no expiry, it survives logout and password change, and it can be + used any number of times. + + ## Credit + + This issue was found with automated analysis (access-control + review) and manually verified. +cvss_v3: 7.4 +unaffected_versions: + - "< 2.0.0" +patched_versions: + - ">= 2.51.0" +related: + url: + - https://rubygems.org/gems/rodauth/versions/2.51.0 + - https://rodauth.jeremyevans.net/rdoc/files/doc/release_notes/2_51_0_txt.html + - https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26 +notes: | + - No CVE from GHSA URL. + - cvss_v3 from GHSA URL diff --git a/lib/rad-ignores.sh b/lib/rad-ignores.sh index 54e958d349..c571b75f07 100755 --- a/lib/rad-ignores.sh +++ b/lib/rad-ignores.sh @@ -378,3 +378,6 @@ rm -f \ gems/sqlite3/CVE-2026-128084.yml \ gems/rails-html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-128068.yml \ gems/rails-html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-128069.yml + +# 11/18/2026: Ruby-Central/cfp-app software/NOT A GEM or language/Unreviewed +# https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rwg8-28hv-mwx6