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32 changes: 32 additions & 0 deletions gems/net-ssh/GHSA-g2r2-x3p2-5677.yml
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---
gem: net-ssh
ghsa: g2r2-x3p2-5677
url: https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-g2r2-x3p2-5677
title: Incomplete fix of GHSA-3x7f-q7wf-fp73 - Net::SSH::Proxy::Jump
still interpolates hops after the first comma into the shell command
date: 2026-10-26
description: |
The fix shipped for GHSA-3x7f-q7wf-fp73 in net-ssh 7.3.5 and 8.0.0.rc2
validates the user and host of every jump, and escapes the other
fields it inserts into the ssh command. It does not escape extra_jumps.
Everything after the first comma is copied raw into -J and executed
by /bin/sh through IO.popen.

The bypass needs two hops. The shell syntax has to be in the second
hop. The same characters on a single hop are parsed as a URI path
and never placed in the command.
unaffected_versions:
- "< 7.3.5"
- "< 8.0.0.rc2"
patched_versions:
- "~> 7.3.8"
- ">= 8.0.4"
related:
url:
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/8.0.4
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/7.3.8
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/blob/master/CHANGES.txt
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-g2r2-x3p2-5677
notes: |
- No CVE from GHSA URL.
- "Moderate" severity from GHSA URL
47 changes: 47 additions & 0 deletions gems/net-ssh/GHSA-hjwv-j52r-xcg7.yml
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---
gem: net-ssh
ghsa: hjwv-j52r-xcg7
url: https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwv-j52r-xcg7
title: net-ssh - @revoked known_hosts entries are treated as
valid pinned host keys — revoked host key accepted
date: 2026-11-06
description: |
Net::SSH's known_hosts parser (Net::SSH::KnownHosts#keys_for) reads
the OpenSSH @marker field but only special-cases @cert-authority.
A line marked @revoked, which is the standard OpenSSH way to
permanently retire a compromised host key, falls into the default
branch and is loaded as a regular, trusted HostKeyEntries::PubKey
pin. Every built-in host-key verifier (:always, :accept_new, and
the default :accept_new_or_local_tunnel) then matches a server
that presents exactly that revoked key and accepts it, even under
the strictest verifier. A revoked key is one the operator already
knows is compromised, and here it authenticates the host anyway.
The revocation entry quietly turns into an authorization entry.
OpenSSH's hostfile.c/check_host_key returns HOST_REVOKED for the
same line and ssh(1) aborts with "Host key ... was revoked", and
ssh_config(5) says keys on a @revoked line "must always be refused".

## Impact

Host authentication bypass that opens a full SSH MITM. The attacker
can read and inject session plaintext (commands, output, uploaded
data), capture credentials sent over password auth, and take over
deploy-tool command channels, since Capistrano, Kamal, and sshkit
all sit on net-ssh. A server the operator explicitly distrusted
is accepted as the real host, so everything the user does over
that connection is exposed.
cvss_v3: 7.4
unaffected_versions:
- "< 6.3.0.beta1"
patched_versions:
- "~> 7.3.9"
- ">= 8.1.1"
related:
url:
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/8.1.1
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/7.3.9
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/blob/master/CHANGES.txt
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwv-j52r-xcg7
notes: |
- No CVE from GHSA URL.
- cvss_v3 from GHSA URL
42 changes: 42 additions & 0 deletions gems/net-ssh/GHSA-qcf4-j55x-72hv.yml
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---
gem: net-ssh
ghsa: qcf4-j55x-72hv
url: https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-qcf4-j55x-72hv
title: Net::SSH::Proxy::HTTPS disables TLS certificate verification
by default (CWE-295)
date: 2026-11-08
description: |
Net::SSH::Proxy::HTTPS exists specifically so that proxy authentication
credentials are sent over an encrypted channel rather than in plaintext
(per its own class documentation: "This has the advantage that proxy
authentication information is not sent in plaintext.").

However, when a caller does not pass an explicit :ssl_context, the class
builds a bare OpenSSL::SSL::SSLContext.new. That default context has
verify_mode == VERIFY_NONE, no trust store, and no hostname verification.
The code then calls SSLSocket#connect on it. As a result the TLS
handshake to the proxy accepts any certificate, including a self-signed
certificate issued for an unrelated hostname.

A network attacker able to intercept the connection to the proxy (the
classic threat model TLS is meant to defend against) can therefore
impersonate the proxy, complete the handshake, and capture the
Proxy-Authorization: Basic credentials that the client sends in the
CONNECT request. Because the class's documented purpose is to keep
those credentials confidential, the insecure default silently defeats
the one guarantee the class offers.
cvss_v3: 6.5
unaffected_versions:
- "< 4.0.0.beta4"
patched_versions:
- "~> 7.3.10"
- ">= 8.1.2"
related:
url:
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/8.1.2
- https://rubygems.org/gems/net-ssh/versions/7.3.10
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/blob/master/CHANGES.txt
- https://github.com/net-ssh/net-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-qcf4-j55x-72hv
notes: |
- No CVE from GHSA URL.
- cvss_v3 from GHSA URL
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