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64 changes: 64 additions & 0 deletions gems/rodauth/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26.yml
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---
gem: rodauth
ghsa: jv3v-q542-9c26
url: https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26
title: WebAuthn authentication challenges are not bound to a session
or single-use, so a captured passkey assertion (signCount 0) can
be replayed indefinitely to log in via webauthn_login
date: 2026-11-16

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GHSA says 2026-11-17 🤔 WDYT?

description: |
WebAuthn assertions can be replayed: authentication challenges are
not bound to the session and are not single-use

## Summary

Rodauth's webauthn feature issues a random authentication challenge
and sends it to the client together with an HMAC (webauthn_auth_challenge /
webauthn_auth_challenge_hmac). On submission, valid_webauthn_credential_auth?
accepts any challenge whose HMAC is valid, taken from the request
parameters. The challenge is not stored server-side, not bound to
the session or account, has no expiry, and is not consumed after use.

So the only thing stopping a previously used assertion from being
accepted again is the WebAuthn signature counter. The WebAuthn spec
lets authenticators always report signCount = 0, and synced passkeys
(iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, most password-manager
passkeys) do. For those credentials, webauthn-ruby's valid_sign_count?
returns true for 0 → 0, so the counter check does nothing.

Result: with webauthn_login (passwordless) enabled, anyone who obtains
one previously submitted /webauthn-login POST body (assertion +
challenge + challenge HMAC) can log in as that user. They can do it
from a fresh, unauthenticated session, as many times as they like,
with no time limit. Logging out or changing the password does not
stop it. Only removing the WebAuthn key does.

## Impact

Full account takeover of any account that uses a synced passkey (or
any authenticator reporting signCount 0) on an app with webauthn_login
(or webauthn_autofill) enabled. The attacker needs one previously
submitted assertion request body. Ways to get one include application
or reverse-proxy request-body logs, APM/error-tracking breadcrumbs,
a debugging proxy, or a one-time script injection on the origin.
Once obtained, the value works as a permanent password-equivalent:
no expiry, it survives logout and password change, and it can be
used any number of times.

## Credit

This issue was found with automated analysis (access-control
review) and manually verified.
cvss_v3: 7.4
unaffected_versions:
- "< 2.0.0"
patched_versions:
- ">= 2.51.0"
related:
url:
- https://rubygems.org/gems/rodauth/versions/2.51.0
- https://rodauth.jeremyevans.net/rdoc/files/doc/release_notes/2_51_0_txt.html
- https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26
notes: |
- No CVE from GHSA URL.
- cvss_v3 from GHSA URL
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions lib/rad-ignores.sh
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Expand Up @@ -378,3 +378,6 @@ rm -f \
gems/sqlite3/CVE-2026-128084.yml \
gems/rails-html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-128068.yml \
gems/rails-html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-128069.yml

# 11/18/2026: Ruby-Central/cfp-app software/NOT A GEM or language/Unreviewed
# https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rwg8-28hv-mwx6
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