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One new rodauth advisory; Added comment to ignore file #1324
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ | ||
| --- | ||
| gem: rodauth | ||
| ghsa: jv3v-q542-9c26 | ||
| url: https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26 | ||
| title: WebAuthn authentication challenges are not bound to a session | ||
| or single-use, so a captured passkey assertion (signCount 0) can | ||
| be replayed indefinitely to log in via webauthn_login | ||
| date: 2026-11-16 | ||
| description: | | ||
| WebAuthn assertions can be replayed: authentication challenges are | ||
| not bound to the session and are not single-use | ||
|
|
||
| ## Summary | ||
|
|
||
| Rodauth's webauthn feature issues a random authentication challenge | ||
| and sends it to the client together with an HMAC (webauthn_auth_challenge / | ||
| webauthn_auth_challenge_hmac). On submission, valid_webauthn_credential_auth? | ||
| accepts any challenge whose HMAC is valid, taken from the request | ||
| parameters. The challenge is not stored server-side, not bound to | ||
| the session or account, has no expiry, and is not consumed after use. | ||
|
|
||
| So the only thing stopping a previously used assertion from being | ||
| accepted again is the WebAuthn signature counter. The WebAuthn spec | ||
| lets authenticators always report signCount = 0, and synced passkeys | ||
| (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, most password-manager | ||
| passkeys) do. For those credentials, webauthn-ruby's valid_sign_count? | ||
| returns true for 0 → 0, so the counter check does nothing. | ||
|
|
||
| Result: with webauthn_login (passwordless) enabled, anyone who obtains | ||
| one previously submitted /webauthn-login POST body (assertion + | ||
| challenge + challenge HMAC) can log in as that user. They can do it | ||
| from a fresh, unauthenticated session, as many times as they like, | ||
| with no time limit. Logging out or changing the password does not | ||
| stop it. Only removing the WebAuthn key does. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Impact | ||
|
|
||
| Full account takeover of any account that uses a synced passkey (or | ||
| any authenticator reporting signCount 0) on an app with webauthn_login | ||
| (or webauthn_autofill) enabled. The attacker needs one previously | ||
| submitted assertion request body. Ways to get one include application | ||
| or reverse-proxy request-body logs, APM/error-tracking breadcrumbs, | ||
| a debugging proxy, or a one-time script injection on the origin. | ||
| Once obtained, the value works as a permanent password-equivalent: | ||
| no expiry, it survives logout and password change, and it can be | ||
| used any number of times. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Credit | ||
|
|
||
| This issue was found with automated analysis (access-control | ||
| review) and manually verified. | ||
| cvss_v3: 7.4 | ||
| unaffected_versions: | ||
| - "< 2.0.0" | ||
| patched_versions: | ||
| - ">= 2.51.0" | ||
| related: | ||
| url: | ||
| - https://rubygems.org/gems/rodauth/versions/2.51.0 | ||
| - https://rodauth.jeremyevans.net/rdoc/files/doc/release_notes/2_51_0_txt.html | ||
| - https://github.com/jeremyevans/rodauth/security/advisories/GHSA-jv3v-q542-9c26 | ||
| notes: | | ||
| - No CVE from GHSA URL. | ||
| - cvss_v3 from GHSA URL | ||
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GHSA says 2026-11-17 🤔 WDYT?